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Abstract
Password managers (PMs) are considered highly effective
tools for increasing security, and a recent study by Pearman
et al. (SOUPS’19) highlighted the motivations and barriers
to adopting PMs. We expand these findings by replicating
Pearman et al.’s protocol and interview instrument applied
to a sample of strictly older adults (>60 years of age), as
the prior work focused on a predominantly younger cohort.
We conducted n = 26 semi-structured interviews with PM
users, built-in browser/operating system PM users, and non-
PM users. The average participant age was 70.4 years. Using
the same codebook from Pearman et al., we showcase differ-
ences and similarities in PM adoption between the samples,
including fears of a single point of failure and the importance
of having control over one’s private information. Meanwhile,
older adults were found to have higher mistrust of cloud stor-
age of passwords and cross-device synchronization. We also
highlight PM adoption motivators for older adults, including
the power of recommendations from family members and the
importance of education and outreach to improve familiarity.
1 Introduction
Knowledge-based mechanisms have been widely adopted to
support security among users. Strong passwords which are not
shared or reused have been recommended since the 1990s [2].
However, these are known to be challenging to recall, leading
to individuals compromising security to achieve memorability.
Multiple studies have attempted to understand the complex
factors which play a role in password creation, management
and storage [34, 35]. Some users’ personal password manage-
ment techniques may involve a trade-off between security and
convenience [31], whereas others may involve heavy reuse of
passwords [36]. Understanding password choices and com-
position also shed light upon the relationship between online
privacy behaviors and password strength [29].
∗This article will be presented at the the 30th USENIX Security Sympo-
sium (Sec’21), August 11-13, 2021.
As a result, security experts often recommend password
managers (PMs) as a means of automatic password gener-
ation, management and storage. PMs are an effective tool
to achieve convenient authentication and improved security
when accessing online accounts [32]. PMs come in many
forms: standalone PMs, like LastPass or 1Password, that auto-
fill, generate, and save passwords; browser-based PMs, like in
Chrome or Firefox, that save entered passwords; and operat-
ing system PMs, like OSX Keychain, that manage passwords
at an OS level across applications, like Wi-Fi passwords.
Given the wide range of choices of PMs, and the widely
touted benefits of using these types of technology, Pearman
et al. analyzed why users do (and do not) use PMs [25].
The researchers conducted semi-structured interviews with
n = 30 participants split between those who do not use a
PM, those who use a built-in browser-/OS-based a PM, and
those who use a standalone PM. Participants described their
password management techniques, trade-offs between con-
venience and security in PM adoption, motivations for and
barriers against adopting PMs, and uncertainty regarding the
source of password-saving prompts on browsers.
Given that older adults express similar concern towards
their digital lives [11], the necessity of convenience [33], and
the need for privacy [27] when using technology, PMs may be
an effective tool for this user group. PMs could help address
concerns relating to declining levels of physical dexterity and
worries relating to cognitive prowess [7]. PM usage could
support good security hygiene, while providing a convenient
option for interaction—limiting the number of passwords to
remember. However, adoption levels of PMs appear to be low
overall [4], and studies of PM adoption have seen minimal
investigation for older adult groups.
In this paper, we expand upon the research of Pearman et
al., which focused on a predominantly younger sample (only
one participant was >60 years old). We replicated the study
conducted by Pearman et al. with an exclusively older adult
sample (n = 26) to analyze differences in PM usage (and
non-usage) with those over 60 years of age. This replication
allowed us to directly compare two age groups using the same
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interview script and codebook. During the semi-structured
interview, participants answered questions relating to authen-
tication habits, password composition strategies, password
management techniques, and overall perceptions of and ex-
periences with PMs. We also sought to recruit roughly equal
samples of participants who do not use PMs, those who use
PMs built into their browsers or operating systems, and those
who use separately installed PMs.
Comparing the three PM user groups, we identified a num-
ber of differences with the relatively younger sample of Pear-
man et al. In particular, we highlight a higher number of
adoption motivators required by older adults. This includes
repeated recommendations from those they trust (close family
members), the need to familiarize themselves with the tool’s
features, and a feeling of urgency to adopt these security tools.
However, once motivated to adopt PMs, we see that older
adults are tenacious users of PMs and engage in more se-
cure practices (such as using the password generator) rather
than simply convenient ones. At the same time, though, older
adults are skeptical of cloud storage of passwords and do not
trust the synchronization process of separately installed PMs.
There are also noted similarities between the younger group
(from Pearman et al.’ study) and older adults (from the study
described in this paper). Those who did not use PMs used
similar password creation and management strategies based
on ad-hoc methods that lead to easily guessable and inse-
cure passwords. This same group, for both younger and older
adults, showed little concern of being vulnerable to attacks
and did not believe they were engaging in risky behavior.
Common barriers towards adoption of PMs were also ap-
parent, such as the fear of a single point of failure, and the
importance of having control over one’s private information.
For the older adults, at least, some of these perspectives may
derive from their concern over self-determination in the pres-
ence of cognitive decline associated with the aging process.
In summary, we make the following contributions:
• We present motivations and barriers to adopting PMs
among older adults, replicating methods from prior work
to allow for direct comparison with younger adults;
• We analyze the motivations for older adults to adopt
and not adopt PMs, such as the cumbersome set-up pro-
cess, the lack of urgency, and the need for a simpler and
convenient method to store passwords;
• We describe the effect of social influence and self-
efficacy for older adults to adopt PMs, such as the impact
of family and other advocates;
• We suggest new techniques for encouraging broader
adoption of PMs among older adults.
This research suggests that encouraging adoption for older
adults, while perhaps more challenging, may lead to strong
security outcomes as compared to their younger counterparts.
We suggest focusing on the role of advocacy and education,
and particularly, the role of (younger) family members in en-
couraging older adults to considering PMs. Efforts to improve
adoption among younger cohorts may have the secondary ef-
fect of also encouraging older adults to maintain good security
hygiene.
2 Related Work
Perceptions of security among older adults. Older adults
are less likely to engage in online activities [10,17] compared
with other age groups. Challenges can be attributed in part to
limited access to Internet services, and inaccessible technolo-
gies which have not been designed to account for older adult
users’ needs. Older adults are also known to express concerns
relating to online security and privacy. For example, Elueze
et al. [11] found that spam, unauthorized access to personal
information, and information misuse were the most pressing
issues. Studies have also examined the older adults online
activities, highlighting the lack of understanding of online
privacy results that can lead to the unintentional distribution
of personal information [24] and vulnerability/susceptibility
to attacks (e.g. targeted phishing threats) [22]. Frik et al. [14]
examined the views of older adults relating to information
collection, transmission and sharing using traditional ICT
and emerging technologies, and found that participants were
unwilling to share financial data and medical records.
Prior work [15, 27] also describes older adults’ adoption
of various privacy protection strategies, such as limiting in-
formation shared online, avoiding the use of online services
and/or technology, ignoring or deleting online requests, and
managing passwords. Evidence of a "privacy divide" was
found by Huang et al. [19], wherein older adults between the
ages of 55-65 were more likely to adopt privacy protection
strategies compared to those aged above 65, which may result
in older age groups (i.e., those >65) being more vulnerable
to online attacks. Das et al. [9] studied user experiences of
two-factor authentication among adults aged 60 or above, and
found that older adults did not fully comprehend the benefits.
Some participants also reported that they found two-factor
authentication to be useless, since they have already adopted
a PM and believed that their data could not be breached.
Password managers. Password managers (PMs) offer the
opportunity for users to centrally store, organize and synchro-
nize passwords across multiple systems and devices. They
also come in multiple varieties. Standalone PMs, like Last-
Pass, Dashlane, KeePass, 1Password, StickyPassword, among
others, are accessed via the web, browser extensions or apps.
Additionally, there are PMs built into many modern web
browsers - notably Chrome will save passwords and syn-
chronize them across installation instances. Built-in PMs, like
that in Chrome, do not always have password generation fea-
tures, but this is also becoming more common; Firefox and
Safari have such features. Some operating systems also have
password management functionality, such as iOS Keystore to
save wifi passwords and application passwords, but can also
2
be used to do more general password management.
Researchers have investigated adoption of PMs [3, 16],
finding low adoption rates [20, 31, 32], particularly among
separately installed PMs. Alkaldi et al. [4] suggested that
poor advertising and failure to reassure the trustworthiness of
PMs are key factors behind low adoption. Fagan et al. [13]
conducted an online survey and found that PM users valued
convenience rather than security while non-users found it
difficult to trust the security of PMs.
Chiasson et al. [8] performed a usability study of two PMs
and found that the largest issues is that users have incomplete
or incorrect mental models of PMs. Participants were found to
experience difficulties "relinquishing control" to the PMs and
did not believe that the PMs offered greater levels of security.
Control was also found to be an important factor in a study by
Karole et al. [21] when it comes to password management for
non-technical users, who were found to prefer to manage their
passwords themselves. Seiler-Hwang et al. [28] evaluated the
usability of mobile PMs, noting three areas for improvement:
security, guidance, and integration with external applications.
The auto-fill policies of PMs were examined in a study
by Silver et al. [30]. The researchers identified several risks
associated with auto-fill policies which could be mitigated
by using PMs to strengthen credential security. Belenko et
al. [6] analyzed PMs on smartphones, and encouraged encryp-
tion of back-up passwords to increase the level of security
while using PMs, in the event of attackers accessing the de-
vice physically. Using MTurk, Lyastani et al. [23] compared
built-in PMs and separately installed PMs. They found that
Google Chrome’s auto-fill feature encouraged password reuse,
whereas LastPass’ password generator encouraged stronger
passwords that are not reused.
Summary of Pearman et al. methods and findings Pear-
man et al. studied password management strategies and moti-
vations for using (and not using) a PM [25]. The researchers
conducted 30 semi-structured interviews with a roughly even
number of stand-alone PM users, OS-/browser-based PM
users, and non-PM users. Pearman et al. found evidence of a
security vs. convenience trade-off, wherein built-in PM users
preferred convenience, as opposed to separately installed PM
users who preferred security. They also determined a number
of factors driving adoption of PMs (such as security, memory
issues, and convenience), as well as barriers to adoption for
non-PM users (security concerns, trust in the company/tool to
not decrypt their passwords). The researchers advocated for
tailored advocacy for increased security and PM adoption.
We attempted to replicate Pearman et al.’s method to com-
pare their predominantly younger sample to an exclusively
older sample. This included using the same interview instru-
ment and codebook to analyze transcripts, allowing for direct
comparisons. And in many ways, we were able to confirm the
findings of Pearman et al. We see key similarities in our sam-
ple regarding non-PM users’ password creation strategies and
the sense that their lack of risky online behavior render them
Part. No. Age Gender PM Usage
1 71 Male Separately Installed PM User
2 72 Female Non-PM User
3 72 Female Non-PM User
4 73 Female Separately Installed PM User
5 72 Female Non-PM User
6 73 Male Built-in PM User
7 78 Male Non-PM User
8 71 Female Built-in PM User
9 61 Male Built-in PM User
10 66 Male Separately Installed PM User
11 61 Female Built-in PM User
12 71 Male Built-in PM User
13 65 Male Non-PM User
14 62 Male Non-PM User
15 68 Female Non-PM User
16 76 Female Built-in PM User
17 69 Male Built-in PM User
18 79 Male Built-in PM User
19 70 Female Non-PM User
20 74 Female Built-in PM User
21 75 Female Non-PM User
22 75 Female Non-PM User
23 68 Male Separately Installed PM User
24 67 Female Separately Installed PM User
25 75 Male Separately Installed PM User
26 66 Female Separately Installed PM User
Table 1: Demographic information
immune from vulnerability. We also see similarities regarding
concerns that using PMs may lead to a single point of failure,
and the importance of having control over one’s own private
information. We also find a number of differences from Pear-
man et al., specifically their experiences, motivators for and
barriers against the adoption of PMs, which are highlighted
throughout Section 5 and summarized in Table 2.
3 Methodology
We conducted 26 semi-structured interviews with older adults
(aged above 60) to understand their password composition
strategies, their online habits with authentication, and their
opinions and experiences with PMs. We also analyzed re-
sponses that spoke to older adult participants’ beliefs and
concerns regarding securing their online accounts. For our
qualitative findings, we use the terms "a few" as 0% to 25%,
"some" as 25% to 45%, "about half" as 45% to 55%, "most"
as 55% to 75%, "almost all" as 75% to 99%, and "all" as 100%
as per Emami-Naeini et al. [12]. The protocol was approved
by our institution’s IRB.
3.1 Interview Method
We used the same interview instrument from Pearman et
al., and as a semi-structured interview, when answers were
unclear, follow-up questions were provided, such as "please
explain more" or "could you provide an example?" The gen-
eral structure of the interview is as follows, and a copy of the
survey material can be found in the Appendix.
Participants were presented with a consent form, and were
allowed to ask questions to the researchers before the inter-
view began. Participants were then asked a series of demo-
graphic questions about their age, identified gender, current
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occupation, level of experience with technology, and a brief
description of their biggest online security concern.
Next, participants were asked a series of questions about
their general password usage for online accounts and from
which devices they access these accounts, if they manually
typed or auto-filled passwords, and if passwords varied across
accounts. Participants were also asked what they found easy
or difficult about how they managed passwords, and if they
ever experienced compromises of their accounts and what
they did (or would do) in such situations.
Participants were then briefed about PMs: "Password man-
agers are tools that can securely handle passwords for you.
They can remember your passwords, generate new ones, and
even sync them across devices." And following, they were
offered descriptions of different forms of PMs, such as stan-
dalone PMs, built-in browser PMs, and OS-based managers.
They were then asked if any of their personal password man-
agement usage fitted these descriptions.
If their usage fitted one of these descriptions, then a series
of follow-up questions were asked about why they selected
this PM, what they find helpful/unhelpful, if passwords were
synchronized, management of a master password (if applica-
ble), and if they use password generation tools. Additional
questions about security hygiene regarding password chang-
ing and data breaches were also included.
If participants did not use a PM, then they were asked
to explain why they do not use one, with additional follow-
up questions for more details. They were also asked about
awareness of the cost of PMs, or if additional features were
available, would this change their mind to adopt a PM.
Interviews were recorded and then transcribed by a com-
mercial transcription service. Participants were requested not
to share any of their passwords or personal information, and if
that did happen, these details were removed from the record-
ings before transcription. Interviews were conducted in person
prior to COVID-19 lockdown, and by phone/video conference
afterward. Each interview took approximately 30 minutes to
conduct for those who did not use a PM and 60 minutes for
those who did. Interviews were mostly conducted by the pri-
mary researcher, a second researcher did assist with a few.
3.2 Analysis Methods
Based on participants’ responses to general questions re-
garding their online accounts, passwords, and password man-
agement techniques, they were categorized into three groups.
This comprised of 10 non-PM users, 9 built-in PM users, and
7 separately installed PM users. These quantities are similar
to those of Pearman et al.’s study with a younger population.
Analysis involved thematic coding of interview transcripts
using the codebook provided by Pearman et al.’s codebook 1.
We chose to use Pearman et al.’s codebook instead of develop-
ing our own since their interview protocol was closely repli-
1Available at https://osf.io/6u7m8/
cated and their codebook was checked for reliability (Refer to
Section 4 for further details). We then analyzed the identified
themes for the older adult sample to draw conclusions on their
behavior by comparing the codes for the three users groups
(PM users, OS-/browser-based PM users, and non-PM users).
We then compared the identified themes to those presented
by Pearman et al. in their description and discussion. We also
considered situations where we could not find a reasonable
code from Pearman et al.’s codebook. In such situations, we
developed a new code and considered this a marker of differ-
ences between age groups. We only identified two additional
codes related to master password composition and perceived
storage of passwords in PMs, which are discussed in Section 5
As a reliability check on our coding process, a second,
reliability coder used Pearman et al.’s codebook, plus our
additional codes, to thematically code 20% of the transcripts.
The reliability coder met with the primary coder to resolve
any differences in applying codes. Following, the primary
coder updated any codes based on those discussions. The
Cohen’s κ= 0.75 was achieved for the 20% sample of coding,
suggesting substantial agreement in applying the codebook.
We did not validate the codebook itself, as this was already
done by Pearman et al., who reported a high-agreement inter-
rater reliability (Cohen’s κ= 0.84).
3.3 Recruitment
While Pearman et al. recruited through online venues such
as Facebook, Craigslist and Reddit, combined with offline
strategies such as posting flyers on bulletin boards without
adopting snowball sampling methods, we recruited partici-
pants from two state-operated senior centers for in-person
interviews and through snowballing following COVID-19 re-
strictions for phone/Skype interviews. We found it difficult
to recruit standalone PM users who were over the age of 60,
which may be anecdotally informative about PM adoption
in this group, and so we used purposive sampling to coun-
terbalance. Our final recruitment is similar in size to that
of Pearman et al.’s samples. Participant demographics are
provided in Table 1.
Participants were eligible for the study if they were over
the age of 60 and maintained at least two online accounts.
Participants were informed that they were not required to
provide any personal information about those accounts, nor
their specific passwords. In-person participants received $10
for their participation. It was, unfortunately, not possible to
compensate remote participants due to our institutions’ poli-
cies. Participants were informed of the latter in advance of
scheduling their remote interviews.
4 Limitations
When examining issues of security and privacy, some partici-
pants may be affected by social desirability bias, wherein they
feel obligated to express good security behavior they do not
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actually practice. We used follow-up questions and probes
in instances where participants provided brief responses to
better understand their true behaviors and practices.
The outbreak of COVID-19 led to a series of restrictions on
recruitment. As a result, we transitioned from conducting in-
terviews from in-person to virtual. We did not find substantive
differences between interviews conducted by phone/Skype
as compared to in-person. We were also challenged in re-
cruiting older adult participants that used separately-installed
PMs, which may anecdotally suggest issues with adoption,
but without a broader survey, we cannot be certain. This led us
to conduct purposive sampling via snowballing, which could
lead to less representativeness in the sample of separately-
installed PM users. The opinions held by this group still offer
key points, particularly in comparison to Pearman et al.’s
study, as they had a similar distribution of participants.
Finally, we did not re-interview younger adults but instead
relied on previously published material from Pearman et al.
As described in Section 3.2, we also did not develop our own
codebook, instead relying on the previously published one. As
the prior work is very recent with a comprehensive, publicly
available dataset and codebook, we are confident that our
methods match those of Pearman et al. and our results are
comparable. Further, the codebook IRR reported by Pearman
et al. (κ = 0.84) shows high agreement, as does our own
application of the codebook (κ= 0.75).
5 Findings
We follow a similar outline Pearman et al. in presenting our
findings. We first focus on the older adult participants and
then offer a comparison to prior work.
5.1 Password Habits
Prioritizing security of financial accounts above oth-
ers, and variance in password strategies among groups
Among older adult participants, separately installed PM users
owned more accounts (greater than 150) than non-PM users
(less than 50). Most participants, regardless of experience with
PMs, echoed that financial accounts were the most important
to protect, as threats to these could cause the most irreparable
damage compared to other sites. Six participants described
a hierarchy of sites where precautions should be taken (e.g.,
Financial sites > Social Media sites > Casual Media sites
(Netflix, news websites).
Most of our participants were aware of the concept of
"strong passwords" encompassing an array of letters, numbers
and/or special characters. However, the three groups showed
differences in strategies of password composition. Non-PM
users tended to use phrases and words of personal significance
for their passwords. Built-in PM users followed a specific pat-
tern, which consisted of a set of characters or numbers which
they would move around to generate passwords. Separately-
installed PM users generally used a completely random set
of numbers and letters, often created by the password gener-
ation feature in their password managers. Participant P14, a
non-password manager user, said,
“It depends on the site. For Amazon, it would be some-
thing like ‘Shop’ then a symbol/special character and
then a number. I relate it to the site in some way.“
On the other hand, password manager user P04 said,
“It should be at least 8 characters with a combination
of numbers, symbols and letters. And it shouldn’t make
sense, so just a random combination.“
Examples of innovative strategies to generate strong pass-
words, included romanizing information from words in other
language scripts (e.g., Hebrew, Arabic), and interspersing with
other characters. One participant mentioned that this made
his password "more random" and more difficult for attack-
ers to guess. Of course, this reflects a perception. Threats
to passwords are targeted, rather then based on complex and
automated guessing algorithms. PM users with technical back-
grounds preferred using the PM password generation feature,
stating that these technologies "adjust to the requirements of
password generation and its level of sophistication."
Comparison to Pearman et al. Participants also described
a similar ranking of account importance in Pearman et al.,
placing financial accounts higher to protect than others. One
of their participants among non-PM users mentioned a similar
strategy to our older adult population, of using words related
to specific things (such as "kids", "cities", "names"). They
also reported owning a similar number of online accounts, as
well as similar password creation strategies.
Selecting stronger passwords based upon perceived im-
portance of accounts. Most non-PM users mentioned that
each password was unique, and they were rarely reused. The
exception was for accounts termed "casual," where there were
instances of repurposing (n=4) or generating a password with
roots in an older password (n=2). However, those participants
highlighted not taking risks for those accounts determined
"important." where security breaches could prove challenging
(e.g., where financial details were present). Some built-in PM
users and separately installed PM users shared traits of other
users - admitting that passwords for less important accounts
shared similarities but more important accounts were unique.
This could be attributed to the higher number of accounts that
password manager users reported having.
Comparison to Pearman et al. This was different to find-
ings described by Pearman et al., where a number of non-PM
users admitted to heavy reuse of passwords, with the excep-
tion of one participant who reused substrings for new pass-
words. A few built-in PM users and separately installed PM
users admitted to some reuse, but limited it to accounts which
were less important, similar to our findings with older adults.
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Similarities Unique To Older Adults Unique To Younger Adults (from Pearman et al.)
• Ranked financial accounts as more important to protect
than other accounts.
• Non-PM users mentioned that passwords were rarely
reused.
• Non-PM users admitted to heavy reuse of passwords.
• Non-PM users used specific words in their passwords. • Non-PM users were unwilling to pay for PMs. • Non-PM users were open to trying built-in PMs.
• Non-PM users were concerned about a single point of
failure.
• Non-PM users valued having control over who has
access to their passwords.
• Non-PM users valued having control over how their
passwords are organized.
• Built-in PM users were concerned about others having
access to their passwords.
• Non-PM users felt that PMs would not be required
since they are unlikely to create more passwords at their
age.
• Non-PM users felt that their accounts were not impor-
tant enough to require a PM.
• Built-in PM users and separately-installed PM users
liked the auto-fill feature and the convenience of not typ-
ing in passwords.
• Built-in PM users did not express difficulties in pass-
word management.
• Built-in PM users expressed concerns about being un-
able to update and view all their saved passwords.
• Separately-installed PM users did not completely trust
PMs to always remember their passwords.
• Built-in PM users were aware of the benefits of
separately-installed PMs but felt that the set-up process
would be too cumbersome.
• Built-in PM users were unaware of certain features and
benefits in separately-installed PMs.
• Separately-installed PM users felt that PMs removed
the need to memorize passwords.
• Built-in PM users did not trust separately-installed PMs
to be invulnerable.
• Built-in PM users did not explicitly express any skepti-
cism about the security of separately-installed PMs.
• Users who adopted separately-installed PMs were mo-
tivated by their desire for better security.
• Master passwords were composed of information that
was personal to the user.
• Master passwords were composed of nonsensical pass-
phrases or were randomly generated.
• Separately-installed PM users were satisfied with the
password generation feature and overall experience of us-
ing a PM.
• Separately-installed PM users found the password gen-
eration feature to be inconvenient and would instead en-
gage in risky behavior by re-using older passwords.
• Separately-installed PM users expressed distrust to-
wards cloud storage and synchronization of passwords.
• Separately-installed PM users preferred cloud storage
and expressed frustration when the lack of cloud storage
hindered their ability to access passwords on other de-
vices.
• Separately-installed PM users were recommended to
adopt PMs by their family members.
• Separately-installed PM users were recommended to
adopt PMs by staff at their workplace and on online fo-
rums.
Table 2: Summary of similarities between findings from Pearman et al. and our own study. Findings unique to older adults and
those unique to younger groups are also described.
5.2 Barriers to Adoption Among Non-PM
Participants
Cost-conscious and unwilling to pay for PM software.
Non-PM users generally responded negatively when ques-
tioned about purchasing a PM, expressing that they were cost-
conscious, and did not deem a PM to be important enough to
pay for. P02 stated,
“When you’re on a fixed income, you’re counting your
pennies. And you gotta see what’s important.“
Some non-PM users described multiple bills they were
currently paying (utilities, cable, subscriptions) and did not
wish to add another item to the list. These participants may
be unaware that free PMs exist, which may affect their choice
of non-adoption.
Comparison to Pearman et al. On a similar note to the
older adults’ negative opinions on the importance of PMs, non-
PM users in Pearman’s study expressed that they did not deem
their accounts valuable enough to require extra security in the
form of a PM. Most non-PM users also expressed that they
were unwilling to pay for PMs. However, they were more
open to trying built-in PMs, or free versions of separately
installed PMs. While older adults didn’t show any interest in
paying for specific features, some participants from Pearman
et al. said they would be willing to pay for special features in
PMs such as identity theft protection.
Favoring tried and tested methods of password manage-
ment, along with desire for control. Most non-PM users
felt that their current method of managing passwords (writ-
ing them down) was a safe and easy method, reducing the
likelihood of forgetting passwords over time. They expressed
the importance of having control over the storage tool used,
and showed distrust towards electronic devices which others
could control remotely. Participant P05 mentioned,
“It’s simple. I always remember what a book is. And my
book is safe. But you can take control of my phone.“
Some non-PM users expressed mild annoyance about the
low portability of writing passwords down but didn’t consider
this as a priority for password management.
Comparison to Pearman et al. Among non-PM users in
Pearman’s study, some participants kept their passwords in a
list stored on their mobile device, since they valued portability,
and were unaware of other methods of accessing passwords
on-the-go. The importance of control was also seen among
Pearman et al.’s younger adults, but from a different perspec-
tive. They valued the control over how their passwords were
organized, and being able to categorize them in specific ways
in a notebook.
Incomplete and erroneous mental models of password
storage within PMs. Mental models were found to vary
considerably between different types of users. When asked
about storage of data, most non-PM users were unable to
venture a guess as to how passwords are stored in PMs. One
non-PM user described, inaccurately, that passwords were
possibly stored as shortcuts, such as keyboard shortcuts.
Safety concerns led most non-PM users to be adamant
about keeping their private information inside their homes,
local computer storage, or physically among their belongings.
As expressed by P22,
“Local storage is more secure because it adds a dimen-
sion of physical security that you can control. It is only
in one place.“
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Comparison to Pearman et al. A few non-PM users in
the study by Pearman et al. expressed concern about using
built-in PMs. One non-PM user felt that passwords stored in a
built-in PM might be lost due to a memory wipe of the device
in her workplace. Both age groups were concerned about the
security of passwords in locations out of their control. How-
ever, Pearman et al.’s participants were also unsure whether
their passwords would be stored correctly.
Worries about dependence on technology to manage pass-
words Most non-PM users voiced concern regarding a sin-
gle point of failure (putting all their passwords in a single
location), and felt that computers can crash at any moment
impacting access to their accounts, or passwords may get ac-
cidentally deleted. Becoming dependent on technology could
be problematic. P02 mentioned,
“What if your computer or something is down and all
your passwords are stored and you can’t retrieve ’em? “
Other older adults felt that using PMs would be acknowl-
edging their diminishing ability to remember information.
P19 mentioned,
“It’s like, technology is great. But what technology does
is [it affects] things that we store in our memory when
we put it in technology. Case in point, how many of us
remember phone numbers anymore? If we keep relying
on technology, we lose the ability to think for ourselves.“
Comparison to Pearman et al. Both samples expressed
concern about keeping all their passwords in one location
and the risks of a single point of failure. Younger adults in
Pearman et al.’s sample were also worried about unsolicited
individuals getting access to all their passwords in one attempt,
while older adults in our study were afraid of putting their trust
in the technology which may fail, rather than their account
being "hacked." While some younger adults felt that they
were giving up a feeling of control by using a PM, this loss
of control appeared more acute for older adults as to them it
may suggest a decline in their cognitive abilities, or the loss
of a way of doing things that they are sentimental about.
Perceived benefits of convenience and portability do not
outweigh security concerns. The overall perceptions of
PMs among non-PM users were negative. While some ac-
knowledged a few benefits of PMs (such as the convenience in
portability and some additional features like password gener-
ation), they still showed resistance and were adamant against
adopting PMs. P13 mentioned,
“Sometimes I might be annoyed because I would be away
from home and I wanted to log in to something and I
didn’t have the password with me. But I wouldn’t use one
[password manager].“
Their concerns with the security (as well as the price of
third-party applications, see above) seemed to outweigh PMs
perceived benefits. They also appeared to be fairly satisfied
with their current methods of managing passwords, and be-
lieved having control over their passwords themselves was
important. P15 said,
“I don’t think it [password manager] is as secure as
keeping it in my good old address book.“
Age also proved to be a factor, as some non-PM users ex-
pressed their disinterest in PMs since they would be unlikely
to create more passwords. P03 expressed,
“I’m not going to be making any more passwords now at
my age. At this time in my life, I’m not going to have any
more accounts than I already have. So I wouldn’t really
need it.“
Comparison to Pearman et al. Some participants from
both age groups were reluctant to use a PM. While older
adults expressed that they would be unlikely to create more
passwords and would thus not require a PM, younger adults
in Pearman et al.’s study felt that their accounts were not
important enough to require extra security offered by PMs.
5.3 Experiences using Built-in PMs
Satisfied with auto-fill functionality when accessing ac-
counts. Almost all built-in PM users were very pleased with
the auto-fill feature in their browsers and operating systems.
While some admitted that a few risks were involved, and
showed small concerns regarding the security of passwords
stored in PMs, the convenience of this method seemed to out-
weigh their concerns. A few participants expressed that PMs
built into browsers are simple to use, and removes the need to
remember passwords themselves.
Comparison to Pearman et al. This was similar to the
built-in PM users’ opinions in Pearman et al.’s study, who
emphasized liking the auto-fill feature, and enjoyed the con-
venience of not having to type their passwords.
Limited levels of concern voiced regarding password
management by non-PM users. Most non-PM users did
not explicitly describe difficulties or negative aspects of their
password management methods that were covered in the ques-
tions asked. However, there may be certain habits that they
didn’t adopt, such as strong encryption of their passwords.
One participant (P9) expressed concern about a third-party
gaining access to a browser’s passwords.
“Sometimes I wonder whether my passwords are safe
there[in browsers]. What if someone just gets in? “
Comparison to Pearman et al. While some built-in PM
users in Pearman et al.’s study also expressed concerns re-
garding others having access to their passwords, their worries
were directed to other individuals using their devices physi-
cally. These younger adults also mentioned concerns about
the built-in PMs being unable to update their saved passwords,
and being unable to view all their saved passwords.
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5.4 Barriers to Adoption of Separately In-
stalled PMs by built-in PM Participants
Lack of strong enough incentives to change current
habits among built-in PM users. Most built-in PM users
felt that their passwords may be accessible to others to an
extent using their current password management techniques
when compared to separately installed PMs, but also admitted
to not having strong enough incentives to adopt a PM such
that they would be willing to change their regular routine.
“My son has been trying to get me to [adopt a separately
installed password manager] for a long time. I have not
done it yet. It’s a good idea, but I’m not used to doing it.
I haven’t done it yet because of inertia and laziness. I’m
so used to getting up in the morning and automatically
logging into Google.“
Participant P08 felt a lack of urgency and therefore felt it
unnecessary to adopt a password manager,
“I would have to be convinced that it is really beneficial to
me in some way. Nothing has happened to me to motivate
me to use a password manager.“
Built-in PM users also felt that it “wasn’t worth the hassle”
and that it would be too difficult to set-up. They were highly
confident that separately installed PMs are the safest method
of storing passwords, but conditioned its convenience on the
difficulty level of setting it up.
Comparison to Pearman et al. Upon comparing the find-
ings, built-in PM users among both age groups stressed the
important of the convenience for storing passwords and were
aware that their password habits were risky and better meth-
ods exist. Both did not take the necessary steps to improve
their situation, but the reasons differed.
While younger adults in Pearman et al.’s study were un-
aware of certain features in separately installed password
managers that may be advantageous (e.g. the password gen-
eration feature) and thus could not properly reflect on the
potential benefits, the older adults in our sample expressed
awareness regarding the benefits of separately installed pass-
word managers but were convinced that the installation and
set-up process would take too much effort, even without at-
tempting to install them in the first place.
Trust in PM technologies influences adoption among
older adult PM users. Levels of trust using PMs varied
across user groups. For example, built-in PM users were gen-
erally more skeptical compared to other user groups regarding
the security of PMs, and felt that any system could be hacked
into.
“They can hack into even the government so what is to
say they can’t hack into a password manager? “
They agreed that portability of separately installed PMs is
a worthwhile feature but mentioned that it may take them a
while to develop trust in adoption. The perceived set-up pro-
cess of separately installed PMs also served as a hindrance for
built-in PM users to adopt a separately installed PM; however,
none of the built-in PM users actually attempted the set-up
process. They also did not trust separately installed PMs to
store passwords in the cloud and expressed a desire to have
more control over who has access to their information. These
same participants seemed unaware that built-in PMs may also
store passwords in the cloud under certain configurations.
Comparison to Pearman et al. Some built-in PM users in
Pearman et al.’s study did not explicitly mention distrust to-
wards separately installed PMs, which differs from our older
adult sample. However, they showed signs of distrust towards
built-in PMs, and confusion regarding the storage of their
passwords in browsers. This confusion led them towards los-
ing their trust in the reliability of these built-in PMs, and
resorting to other insecure methods.
5.5 Experiences using Separately Installed
PMs
Among PM users, 1Password was the most popular ap-
plication (n=4), followed by LastPass (n=2), and DashLane
(n=1). Three participants also kept back-ups of passwords in
address books. Most PM users highlighted satisfaction with
their PMs.
Master passwords were composed of personal informa-
tion. Most PM users had developed master passwords for
their PMs, which were retained in memory without any fur-
ther digital or physical record of them. To ease the process
of recalling information, five participants revealed that their
master password was memorable, composed of information
that was personal to them or someone close to them (e.g., for-
mer phone number, mother’s middle name, spouse’s maiden
name), which was combined with other numbers and special
characters which also carried meaning to them (e.g., birth
dates etc.). A sequence of random characters would be more
complex to remember, and could result in time being spent to
recall or reset should it be forgotten. As described by P25,
“It’s something that I would remember. I memorized it.
No memory aid. No physical copy of it. It is just my
wife’s name with numbers and special characters. It is
not gibberish More of a phrase really.“
Comparison to Pearman et al. Prior work showed vast
differences in master password composition and management.
Some participants mentioned using pass-phrases like movie
quotes or sentences that didn’t make any sense, whereas others
used passwords which were randomly generated. Since some
of these passwords were difficult to memorize, they would
often resort to keeping written copies, or saving them as email
drafts. Older adults in our study, in contrast, explicitly selected
master passwords they can manage without aides; not to sug-
gest these are more/less secure than the master passwords of
the younger sample.
Extensive use of automatic password generation function-
ality among certain separately installed PM users. Four
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separately installed PM participants described using the pass-
word generation function extensively. Three did not (of which
one was not aware it existed). Of the four who use it, three had
no complaints and were highly satisfied, as it helped mitigate
the need to think about how to compose a strong password.
However, one participant felt that the functionality allowed
for setting lengthy passwords, describing that it "went too
overboard." That participant adjusted the slider to choose the
number of characters. Despite this, she also mentioned that an
average of 75-90% of all her passwords were generated using
this feature. None of the built-in PM users reported using a
password generator, nor any of the non-PM users.
Comparison to Pearman et al. While all separately in-
stalled PM users in Pearman et al.’s study reported using
password generators, some were not satisfied with the experi-
ence and found it inconvenient, and would sometimes engage
in risky behavior by reusing older passwords instead. This
could suggest that older adults view the password generation
feature as a more convenient and positive feature.
Appreciative of specific PM features. PM functionality fa-
vored included the historical record kept of the password and
the Face ID feature (n=5), the auto-fill capability (n=2), and
being able to change length and type of characters of their
password with simplicity and ease (n=2). In terms of down-
sides, one participant mentioned that they would prefer the
customization settings to be more visible, reducing the time
to get going with the software (e.g., to adjust the frequency of
logins using the master password). Two participants were not
entirely comfortable with the stability of the system. As stated
by P25 (although, we are unsure exactly how this occurred),
“One time it just stopped working. It was gone. I lost the
whole account.“
A couple of PM users explicitly mentioned the simplic-
ity of the set-up, learnability and the ease of use. Most PM
users described their positive experience using the password
generation feature. A few participants liked the organization
and consolidation of data entry and the ease of data migra-
tion between devices. Some participants had no complaints
regarding any features of the password manager. One partic-
ipant (P01) did not like the updated appearance of the user
interface, and mentioned that the previous interface was easier
to navigate. Another participant (P10) felt interrupted by the
password manager whenever they visit a new website.
“They always interrupt me when I’m on a new site. They
always offer to generate a new password for me. I don’t
want to.“
Despite interruption, P10 still used password generation.
Most separately installed PM users appeared vaguely aware
but did not use the PM’s dashboard function which evaluates
the strength of current passwords. P24 expressed indifference,
“It always tells me the password I have chosen is not that
strong. But I don’t care. I don’t pay attention. Accord-
ing to them, most of my passwords are medium strength,
whatever that is.“
P23 felt that his encrypred passwords were inaccessible to the
dashboard and thus did not pay attention to it,
“I don’t think the dashboard even knows what my pass-
words are, because they are encrypted. The company
1Password cannot decrypt them.“
This also demonstrates some confusion regarding how data
is handled by separately installed PMs, where only the PM
clients (with access to the master password) can decrypt the
passwords, and thus the dashboard information is actually
generated locally.
Comparison to Pearman et al. Similar to our study, some
participants from Pearman et al.’s study were very pleased
with the auto-fill feature of PMs. However, some of Pearman’s
participants were also displeased about the lack of certain
features, such as being unable to enter their long passwords
into non-compatible devices and a few websites, which was
not mentioned by participants in our study. This could be
attributed to older adults using a smaller range of devices and
websites than younger adults.
Factors motivating participants to pay for PMs vary de-
pending on extended functionality available, and recom-
mendations from experts. Five participants used the paid
version of their password managers and two participants used
the free version. One participant who used the paid version
believed that the people who designed it should be rewarded,
as it offered enough features to feel secure. Another partic-
ipant who used the paid version said that they wanted the
data migration feature which was in the paid version. Those
who used the free version said they would only be willing to
use the paid version if recommended by somebody who is an
expert, and would need to see a demonstration. Participants
paid $25-$30 a year to purchase or maintain subscriptions.
Comparison to Pearman et al. Separately installed PM
users in Pearman et al.’s study, who used a free version of the
PM, mentioned that they would only pay a fee if the tool was
very secure and user-friendly. Those who were willing to pay
for a PM expressed that they would pay less than $5 a month.
Experience of setting-up PMs varies, which may limit us-
age. Some participants mentioned that PMs were very easy
to set-up and there were clear instructions available. The ex-
perience was described as friendly and simple to follow. P25
expressed his contentment with the ease of installation and
user-friendly guidelines for adopting PMs,
“It’s really simple, easy and friendly. The website had a
list of instructions on what to do. The instructions were
very clear, and if I followed the steps as it was written, it
was no problem. It just works. I could see problems faced
by those who don’t understand technology.“
On the other hand, some participants mentioned feeling
overwhelmed by the number of options and settings while
installing their PMs. Participant P01 expressed,
“The password manager would drive you crazy with the
number of features it showed. I had to pick out the ones
that I need.“
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Comparison to Pearman et al. We see similar opinions
in Pearman et al.’s study. While most younger adult partic-
ipants did not face many issues, a few separately installed
PM users found the experience cumbersome and unsatisfac-
tory, sometimes resorting to reusing older passwords instead.
Some positive sentiments about the set-up process may also
be affected by the fact that most older adults had simpler set-
ups, exclusively used the PM on one platform, either mobile
or desktop, and did not trust synchronization features (see
below).
Some distrust towards security of storing data in the
cloud. Aside from two separately installed PM users who
use the PM on a desktop device, the remaining five partici-
pants described using PMs exclusively on their mobile phones.
Participant P25 mentioned the reason for this being that he
does not trust cloud storage to securely store his passwords,
“Because I don’t want to go into the cloud. If I use it on
the desktop, I need to consent to cloud storage.“
This reflects a recurring misconception about password stor-
age in PMs which will store passwords encrypted in the cloud,
even when only installed on a single device.
Another participant (P23) justified not using the PM on his
laptop, claiming it to be unnecessary because his laptop is
heavily encrypted.
“I don’t use a password manager on my laptop because it
is always with me. Everything on my laptop is encrypted.“
This demonstrates a second common confusion; threats to
passwords often occur externally, due to data breaches, not
from insecurity of personal devices.
Comparison to Pearman et al. Some separately installed
PM users from Pearman et al.’s study specifically enjoyed
using a desktop client of their PMs and expressed frustration
when a lack of cloud storage hindered their ability to access
passwords from their mobile devices, which differed from
older adults’ distrust of cloud storage. This discrepancy with
the older adult sample may derive from misconceptions about
the way in which passwords are stored and synchronized, as
well as misunderstandings about local security risks (such as
access to a laptop) and remote access security risks (such as
access to an online account).
Skepticism regarding synchronizing passwords. While
participants with separately installed PMs did not use these
technologies across devices (see above). They also shared
dislike and distrust with synchronizing passwords, describing
synchronization as being an insecure process which increases
their exposure to breaches. P04 expressed her concerns along
these lines.
“If they claim to be syncing passwords across all my
devices, that means they are storing them somewhere
outside my apartment.“
Again, this also expresses a misconception regarding how
passwords are managed by PMs, which have encrypted cloud
backups to provide synchronization.
A similar sentiment was expressed by P25, who was afraid
of others gaining access to his mobile phone, which he be-
lieved would provide access to the password storage.
“I don’t want that. It is too easy to leave your phone on
somewhere. Someone scrolls through it and forwards it
to their email. For security reasons, I wouldn’t want that.“
However, the PM on the phone would still need the master
password (or a biometric) to access the passwords.
One participant (P01) did acknowledge the convenience
of syncing, and felt that there are no consequences if the
passwords are strongly encrypted in the first place. He felt
that synchronization of passwords and sharing of accounts is
perhaps manageable as long as control and ownership of the
account remains intact.
“I am hypocritically comfortable with sharing Netflix.
But the way it is shared I think the account owner can
maintain control of the password. It would be up to the ac-
count owner to log in. The password should be protected
by the owner. Control is important.“
Another participant (P24) also valued the syncing feature.
She felt that it is convenient and that there are no conse-
quences as long as it is strongly encrypted. She also felt that
a backup would be useful if her phone were damaged or lost.
“I access the same thing across different devices. There
aren’t any consequences if the part involved in the sync
is strongly encrypted. If I lose my passwords, I would be
sunk. I have too many accounts. I would hate to have
to [go] back and say I Forgot My Password for every
account. For me, it’s peace of mind.“
Comparison to Pearman et al. The overall dislike of syn-
chronization of passwords differed from that of younger adults
in Pearman et al.’s study, where multiple participants ex-
pressed synchronization as an important feature. Without
synchronization, some participants in Pearman et al. even re-
sorted to emailing their passwords to themselves. In contrast,
our older adult participants view sync-ing as a potential threat
to the security of PMs, particularly because they inaccurately
believe that the passwords would only be stored locally if they
choose not to sync. They also do not see this as an impedi-
ment to PM convenience, perhaps because they have fewer
devices and access fewer accounts.
Overall satisfaction and confidence in using PMs among
participants who utilized them. Aside from one older adult
password manager user in our study, the remaining partici-
pants described being satisfied with their experience of using
password managers. They described multiple features that
they felt confident using, such as the password generator, and
the auto-fill feature.
Comparison to Pearman et al. Younger adults from Pear-
man et al.’s study appeared to offer more complaints about
PMs. This could be because the older adults use PMs less
often in fewer contexts (e.g., mobile only) and utilize fewer
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features (e.g., no synchronization). It may also reflect that
the older adult sample, having gone through greater effort to
adopt PM’s than younger adults, are attempting to justify that
experience with stronger feelings of satisfaction.
Concerns regarding PMs’ abilities to maintain passwords
data over time. Most of the separately installed PM users
did not fully trust PMs to remember their passwords despite
high satisfaction with PMs. Some of these participants were
simply skeptical of having complete faith in PMs, and one
participant’s distrust derived from a bad experience of their
PM disappearing from their device. P10 highlights errors
which may occur during data migration, and the importance
of maintaining a back-up of passwords, since they did not
complete trust in the PM’s ability to store passwords.
“There can always be an error in the program or when
you transfer to a new phone. It’s only human. Some hu-
man set it up and anyone can make a mistake. That’s
why I keep a back-up. No matter what DashLane does,
I still have my contact list. I guess the fact that I have a
back-up says I don’t trust it.“
One participant completely trusted his PM. In follow up ques-
tions, he revealed that this trust stems from a sense of control
over which passwords are stored and which are not, and that
they do not change without direct action. Participant P04 said,
“I’m expecting that the password manager will only
change [the password] if I change the password. I am in
control when it is changing.“
Some separately installed PM users felt that errors occurred
(a form of mistrust) and kept a back-up in case of emergen-
cies, such as system crashes or problems with their devices.
However, when it came to security, most of the separately
installed PM users trusted their PMs to keep their information
safe from external attacks and valued the additional security.
“I think PMs protect my passwords from external threats.
That’s part of why it’s there. I believe they [passwords]
are safe and secure through being encrypted inside of the
program.“
Comparison to Pearman et al. Similar trust issues with
the PMs’ ability to remember passwords were seen in Pear-
man et al.’s study, where participants reported instances where
the PM would incorrectly save usernames and passwords. In-
stances were also described where a participant did not trust
their PM to submit completed credentials while logging into
online accounts, as errors by the PM were made in the past.
5.6 Adoption Motivators to use Separately In-
stalled PMs
Needing PMs due to the volume of passwords which need
to be remembered. Most of the separately installed PM
users felt that they had too many passwords and wanted an
easy way to store them. Some also desired greater levels of
security. One participant mentioned that the user reviews of
the PM on the App Store were very high, which encouraged
him to install it on his mobile device.
Comparison to Pearman et al. Similarities were seen
with Pearman et al.’s study, where most separately installed
PM users described using PMs as a better way to store pass-
words, removing the burden of memorizing multiple pass-
words, and having to manually enter passwords when access-
ing systems.
Recommended to use PMs by family members. Most sep-
arately installed PM users mentioned that a family member
recommended they adopt a PM. One participant (P24) was
also given guidance on how to create better passwords.
“My son recommended it to me...I had a brief discussion
with him on how to create my passwords and he helped
me.“
Some participants were advised on password generation
guidelines by experts in the field whom they trusted. As ex-
pressed by participant P24,
“It would have to be somebody who had, you know, in-
depth knowledge, not just a lay person knowledge, but
in-depth knowledge of Internet security issues.“
Comparison to Pearman et al. Some separately installed
PM users in Pearman et al.’s study received recommendations
from different sources.This included being recommended by
staff at their workplaces, and on online forums, like Reddit.
Security benefits of PMs outweighing benefits of alterna-
tive solutions among separately installed PM users. Five
of the seven separately installed PM users believed their pass-
words to be secure in their PM due to them being built by
“skilled programmers” and being heavily encrypted. Partici-
pant P10 mentioned,
“Since I am using it only on the PC, all the stuff is stored
in the PC and nowhere else, and maybe they are en-
crypted. Maybe I’m wrong.“
On the other hand, two participants were skeptical and did
not believe PMs to be absolutely secure. Participant P01 said,
“There is always a chance that something might go
wrong. You learn not to feel too good about these things.
Based on what I read, what experts say about it, I feel
comfortable in that. But then again, I don’t know how
secure it is. I cannot say with 100% certainty that it is.“
Participant P23 believed that the security of his PM does
not matter, since attackers would need to access to his mobile
phone first. He believed that attackers would need to physi-
cally obtain his mobile phone to get access to his passwords.
“No, because it is only on my device. It is unlikely some-
one can get my phone and then [get] into my password
manager.“
This is likely a misconception. Passwords are backed-up (and
encrypted) on cloud services based on the master password.
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Comparison to Pearman et al. Similarities were seen
with Pearman et al.’s study, where most participants expressed
a desire for increased security to be an adoption motivator for
PMs and were satisfied with the encryption used by PMs. One
separately installed PM user believed he was able to store
passwords that were not vulnerable to "dictionary attacks."
However, some participants resorted to insecure practices
when their PMs did not function as intended, which involved
reusing older passwords instead of randomly generating new
ones. This differed from older adults’ positive experiences
with password generation using PMs.
6 Discussion
When comparing our results to Pearman et al. in Section 5,
there are commonalities: valuing secure access to financial
accounts above other types of online accounts, concerns such
as a fear of a single point of failure (e.g., losing access to all
passwords stored in one place), and the importance of having
control over one’s private information. In terms of differences,
master password management strategies were found to vary.
Older adults were found to have a higher mistrust of cloud
storage of passwords and cross-device synchronization.
We also observed various alternatives towards password
management by non-PM users. Multiple participants pre-
ferred writing their passwords in an address book, allowing
them to maintain an organized and portable record of all their
passwords. This certainly encourages using and eases the use
of different passwords for different sites, and these older adult
users may not need to adopt a PM for their security needs. We
believe that PMs offer a benefit to many older users, but we
do not argue its a panacea or the right solution for everyone.
It likely offers significant improvements over current meth-
ods, especially those without meaningful password manage
strategies, but as we identify here, the burden to adoption may
be too high for many older adult users.
In this section, we broadly discuss the barriers of adoptions
we observed, as well as how these results could be applied
to encourage wider usage of PMs for older adult users who
would find benefit from adopting a PM. Finally, we discuss
lessons learned from the user experience of PMs and how to
encourage more effective use of PMs.
6.1 Barriers to PM adoption in Older Adults
Time management and disruptions. Older adults may be
more sensitive to their management of time online, for exam-
ple, stating things like Facebook is a "time-waster," which
may decrease motivations to invest time in adopting a PM. A
large number of built-in PM users expressed that setting up
and installing a stand-alone PM would require a large amount
of effort and would be “too much of a hassle," all the while
aware of potential benefits with regards to security. Some
older adults simply expressed hesitation in disrupting their
current privacy behaviors, which were deemed sufficient.
Effect of technology on memory and control. Users’ men-
tal models of PMs are known to be incomplete or inaccu-
rate [8]. The importance of control was mentioned by older
adults and their need to feel less dependent on technology.
Their cognitive process related to memory was found to be
highly important and connoted negatively on their physical
decline. Non-PM users narrated anecdotes of being able to
remember phone numbers of close friends, and relying on
technology for these purposes would inadvertently affect their
ability to do the same. Concerns were also raised on an over-
arching issue with younger generations’ addiction and de-
pendency on mobile devices, and their impact on cognitive
abilities. Relying on technology to remember information
may also be a signifier of increased age, and a subconscious
fear of losing the ability to recall information.
Lack of self-efficacy. Some older adults’ inexperience and
low confidence with technology led them to quickly blame
themselves when challenges emerged. This may be a conse-
quence of perceptions of a digital divide among older adults.
Small errors quickly compound, leading to self-blame and
eventually abandoning adoption, or never attempting in the
first place. Some PM users were quick to believe that issues
are brought about by their own actions and concerns, rather
than the usability or the software itself.
Lack of trust. Alkaldi et al. [4] found that a significant bar-
rier towards adoption of PMs was the lack of reassurance
to potential users about their trustworthiness. We see simi-
lar signs of mistrust among older adults, especially when it
comes to storage of their passwords. Older adults showed
concern about cloud storage and who has access to passwords
stored in the cloud. A higher level of transparency showing
users how secure their passwords are (when stored in the PM)
could help towards alleviating their concerns and increasing
levels of trust, which is also shown in Alkaldi et al.’s study.
6.2 Encouraging PM Adoption in Older
Adults
Advocacy from family members. Advocates have played
an important role in supporting security among a wide range
of users [18, 37]. Advocacy organizations such as AARP
have begun informing older adults on interventions to use to
support security, through targeted web sites and podcasts [1].
Encouraging advocates to highlight the effectiveness of PMs,
and to offer on-going support during the process of set-up and
using these technologies, can offer promise to older adults.
We find that advocacy is also important, particularly from
family and close friends. Many participants described their
adoption of PM was driven by suggestions and advice from
loved ones. For example, participant P24 stated that she
started "using LastPass because her son showed it to her."
He had used the technology successfully, as he was an advo-
cate. Multiple built-in PM users said that close friends and
family had brought up PMs in conversation, which allowed
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them to consider trying these out. This implies that encour-
agement and advice from known members (e.g. family, close
friends) are valued by older adults, and conversely, family
members seem to be concerned about the security of older
adults’ private information. As such, encouraging adoption of
PMs of younger adults may in turn increase older adult adop-
tion as these users become advocates to their close friends
and, particularly, their older family members.
The role of education and outreach. Some non-PM users
were aware of their risky behavior and insecure methods, but
showed little motivation or any sense of urgency in adopt-
ing better password management techniques. We have seen
evidence of urgency being a wake-up call for older adults,
wherein social isolation (brought about by COVID-19) has
encouraged older adults to move towards adopting online
technology [26]. The lack of a sense of urgency shown by
older adults was also seen among participants in a study by
Aurigemma et al. [5] with undergraduate students, which may
suggest an overlap between students and older adults’ lack of
a sense of urgency.
Education and outreach can help older adults better under-
stand the urgency of secure practices. Classes at senior centers
and libraries, which have begun to adopt security initiatives to
support older adults, could be a vital outlet to disseminate this
information. Classes could incorporate the practical applica-
tion of online security tools (such as PMs) in these classes,
while taking into account the mental models of older adults.
Older adults could test out PM technologies, which may better
address worries regarding the learning curve faced. Erroneous
and incomplete mental models of how PMs work (For exam-
ple: encryption, cloud storage, etc.) surfaced multiple times
during our interviews. The role of education could help to-
wards correcting these mental models which may impact their
decision to adopt PMs in the future.
6.3 Design Implications for PM Adoption
As described in Section 5.2, a few non-PM users showed
concern (or confusion) about storing their passwords in pass-
word managers and not knowing how or where their pass-
words are stored (i.e., on the device, in the cloud etc.). To
address this, targeted advertising providing clear and visible
context for the storage of passwords could potentially help
alleviate some of these fears. Modifying PM interfaces to
display content which reassures users of the security of their
passwords could also prove to be beneficial and invoke greater
levels of trust. Pearman et al. also suggest emphasizing the
sorting and retrieval capabilities of separately installed PMs
for those users who value organization of their passwords.
Most built-in PM users liked using the auto-fill feature of
browser-based PMs. This feature could be made more trans-
parent in PM interfaces to encourage this group of users. A
few non-PM users also mentioned being required to add extra
characters to meet the requirements of some websites, sug-
gesting that their passwords may be too weak to be used. They
would often resort to adding characters as instructed by the
websites. This could be a good opportunity to provide nudges
on these websites, to use PMs for better password genera-
tion. This suggestion was also offered by Pearman et al. for
a younger demographic, which implies that both age groups
could benefit from this. Lyastani et al. [23] also suggested
that the existence of password generators is beneficial. Our
findings confirm this as well; older adults who used the pass-
word generation feature in PMs showed appreciation for its
benefits towards creating stronger and lengthier passwords.
Some built-in PM users felt that the set-up process for PMs
was too cumbersome, even though they were aware of the
potential benefits of security associated with PMs. PMs could
potentially be designed to allow for a more streamlined set-up
process or better demonstrating how this process works as part
of promotions. Since built-in PM users mentioned that they
heard about PMs on websites, these design implications could
also be expressed via third-party websites as methods to im-
prove security hygiene. While separately installed PM users
in our study seemed comfortable with (and aware of) their
PM’s features, Pearman et al. found that separately installed
PM users were unaware of features involving automatic re-
placement of weak passwords, and they suggest implementing
a feature to provide assistance to users in improving existing
passwords at the time of PM adoption.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we describe a study examining the reasons
why older adults use (and do not use) password managers
(PMs), replicating a protocol used by Pearman et al. [25].
We found that opinions regarding online security, PMs, trust
and password management creation strategies differed among
non-PM users, built-in PM users, and separately installed PM
users in the older adult sample.
Using the same codebook as Pearman et al., we directly
compared our older adult sample to Pearman et al.’s predomi-
nately younger sample. Older adults express more favorable
experiences using PMs. Conversely, they also have a higher
mistrust of cloud storage of passwords and cross-device syn-
chronization. They shared common concerns when it came to
the risks of a single point of failure.
We discuss possible adoption motivators for PMs. Older
adults who adopted PM were repeatedly recommended to
do so by close family members. These advocates are crucial
in encouraging broader adoption, and so actions to improve
adoption among younger adults will percolate to the older
population as well. Additionally, we identify the role that
education and outreach can play to help provide familiar-
ity to PMs, as well as providing more sense of urgency to
utilize them by better describing the risks associated with
poor password management practices. We also offer design
implications for PM adoption targeted towards older adults.
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Appendix
We used an interview script identical to that of Pearman et
al. [25]. The codebook used by Pearman et al. is available at
https://osf.io/6u7m8/.
General Questions about Passwords
15
1. What types of online accounts do you have? (e.g. social
media, bank accounts, shopping sites, etc.)
2. What level of protection do you think they each
need?(Follow up, if necessary): Are there some accounts
you want to protect more than others?
3. To the best of your knowledge, approximately how many
online accounts do you have that use passwords?
4. How many of these do you access on a daily basis?
5. On which device(s) do you access these online accounts?
Follow-up below for each category the person has.)
(a) For phones/tablets: what type(s)? (iPhone, An-
droid,etc.)
(b) For computers: what operating system(s)? (Win-
dows, Mac, Linux, ChromeOS, etc.)
(c) Public, work or personal device?
(d) For each device: what web browser do you use
most often on your [device]?
6. How many times do you manually type in passwords
on a daily basis? (Which types of accounts? On which
device(s)?)
7. How many of your accounts are always logged in?
(Which types of accounts? On which device(s)?)
8. Do you have any passwords that get auto-filled for you?
(Which types of accounts? On which device(s)? Do you
know how your passwords are auto-filled)
9. Are your passwords different for each account?
(a) (If yes) Are your passwords similar to one another?
(b) (if reuse exists): How many of your accounts share
the same password? How many of your accounts
have unique passwords?
10. How do you create a password for a new account?
(a) How does this password compare to other pass-
words? (i.e. is it similar?)
(b) What if your password does not meet the charac-
ter/length requirements. How would you change
your password to meet those requirements?
(c) Is this process different for some types of ac-
counts?Which ones? What do you do?
11. How do you keep track of your passwords now? Do you
use more than one method?
12. Are you satisfied with your current method(s) of manag-
ing your passwords? (What do you find easy about it?
What do you find difficult about it?)
13. Has anyone ever logged into any of your accounts with-
out your permission?
(a) (if yes) Was this done by someone you didn’t
know?
(b) (if yes) What did you do? Follow up, if applica-
ble: Did you change the compromised password?
How did you choose the new password? How does
the new password compare to your existing pass-
words? Did you change the passwords to your other
accounts that share the same password?
(c) (if no) What would you do if someone did? (Would
you change the compromised pass-word? If yes,
how would you choose the new password? How
would you choose it?
14. To your knowledge, have any of your accounts ever been
subject to a password data breach?
(a) (if yes) How did you find out about it? What did
you do? After the breach, did you change the way
you manage your passwords? Did that account
share a password with any of your other accounts?
If so, did you change any of those passwords?
(b) (if no) What would you do if it was?
General Questions about Passwords Managers
1. Have you ever heard of password managers? Where
didyou hear about them?
2. Do you use a password manager?
3. What, to your knowledge, is the purpose of a password
manager? (If they respond to something along the lines
of "it manages passwords") What else do you think
they’re used for?
4. Read description of password managers to participant
Password managers are tools that can securely han-
dle passwords for you. They can remember your pass-
words,generate new ones, and even sync them across
devices.There are various types of password managers
with different features, but for the purpose of this inter-
view, we will consider three of them.
One type of password manager is built into the web
browser, such as Google Chrome, Mozilla Firefox,
Safari,Internet Explorer, and Microsoft Edge. These
browser scan remember passwords for websites, as well
as autofill them for you
Another type of password manager is a third-party ap-
plication. This can be software you install directly onto
your devices or a service you can access on the web. It
can also remember and/or autofill your passwords, in-
cluding across browsers and devices.
Lastly, your operating system can serve as a password
manager as well. For example, the Keychain function-
ality on MacOS can remember passwords in and out of
your browser. It can also be used with iCloud to sync
passwords across Apple devices.
Ultimately, the main purpose of password managers is
to automatically handle your passwords for you.
5. Based on our description, which of these categories of-
password managers do you currently use, if any?
6. Have you used any [other] password manager tools in
the past?
7. (If they have used PM, now or in the past) When did
you start using a password manager? Why did you start
using it?
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8. (if stopped use): When did you stop using the password
manager and why?
9. (If they use any and haven’t already named them) Can
you name the password management tools that you
use?(Or if they can’t name them, ask them to describe
them /indicate how they use them so that you can try to
discern what they mean)
Experience using Password Managers
1. Why did you choose [PM]?
2. How has your experience been using a password man-
ager?
3. What functions did you like / find helpful?
4. What functions did you dislike / find unhelpful?
5. Is all functionality of your password manager available
for free, or does this tool have a paid version?
(a) (If paid version exists) Do you use the paid or free
version? Why?
(b) (if uses free version) Would you ever pay for a
password manager? How much? What features
would it have?
6. Do you use your password manager on all of your de-
vices, including [list of tools they already told you about
in the first section] (if no, which devices do you use it
on? Why do you use it on those? Why not use it on
the others? How do you keep track of passwords on the
device(s) that you don’t use your PM on?)
7. (For each device that the user uses PM on): Did you
have to install an application to your device, or install
an extension to your browser, or both? (if no, How do
you access your password manager? Possible answers
include logging into a website,or USB drive)
8. Does your password manager offer the option of syncing
passwords between devices? (If this option exists, do
you use it? Why or why not?)
9. Do you use your password manager for all the accounts
you access through your web browser? (If not, how do
you decide which accounts to use it for? How do you
keep track of passwords that are not stored in this PM?)
10. Do you use your password manager for any accounts
outside of your web browser? Examples of this would
include an email client like Outlook on your computer
or a social media app such as Facebook on your phone.
(a) Do you use it for all of the accounts outside of your
web browser(s)?
(b) (if no to a) How do you decide which accounts to
use it for?
11. Do you have to provide a master password or other au-
thentication to access the passwords stored in your pass-
word manager?
(a) (If yes) What type of password or authentication is
required?
i. (if master password): How did you create your
master password? Is your master password
similar to your other passwords? Is it difficult
to remember your master password? (if yes)
How do you remember it?
(b) (If yes) How often do you have to provide it?
(c) Have you ever modified the default settings to
change how often you have to provide this?
12. Do you feel like your passwords are safe and secure
when stored in this PM tool?
13. Do you know how this tool protects the security of your
passwords? (Unless they say they have no idea, ask them
to elaborate on how they think it works)
14. Does your password manager have a password genera-
tion tool?
(a) (if yes) Have you ever used the password genera-
tion tool? (if yes, below)
i. Do you use the generation tool for newly cre-
ated accounts?
ii. Have you used the tool to generate a new pass-
word for an existing account?
iii. (if yes to B) Does your password manage have
an automatic password replacement feature
that changes passwords for you without you
having to actually visit the website yourself?
Do you use it? Why or why not?
iv. Approximately how many of your passwords
are now created by the password generation
functionality?
v. Do you ever change the settings from the de-
faults when generating a password?
vi. Was there an instance where the generated
password did not meet the website’s password
requirements? (If yes) What did you do about
it?
vii. Overall, how has your experience been using
the password generation tool?
15. Does your password manager have a dashboard or tool
hat examines the security of your passwords?
(a) (If yes): How often do you use it?
(b) Have you changed any of your passwords after
looking at this information?
16. Has your password manager ever informed you of a data
breach? (If yes, what did you do?
17. Has your password manager ever prompted you to
change your password? (if yes, under what situation?
What did you do?)
18. Are there any additional services or features that you
would want in your password manager?
Why not Using PMs? (If answer “no” to Using Password
Managers)
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1. Can you tell us why you aren’t using a password man-
ager? (Follow up by probing what it would take for them
to use a password manager.)
2. Many third-party password managers require a monthly
fee to use their services. Would you be willing to pay for
such a service?
(a) If yes, how much?
(b) If no, why not? (If participant says there are free
third-party PMs available, then ask: Would you be
willing to pay for additional features that are not
included in the free version? How much would you
be willing to pay?)
Perceptions of Password Managers’ Functions
We talked about different types of password managers a
few minutes ago, including third-party password managers,
pass-word managers built into web browsers, and password
managers built into operating systems.
1. Do you think some types of password manager tools are
safer to use than others? (Why?)
2. Do you think some types of password manager tools are
more convenient than others? (Why?)
3. How do you think password manager tools compare to
other methods of managing passwords, such as writing
them down on paper or saving them in a file on your
computer? (Why?)
4. How do you think password managers store passwords?
(a) Do you think password managers store your pass-
words locally on your device or on a server (in the
cloud)? Do you think one is more secure than the
other? (If so, which one? Why?) Do you have a
preference? Why or why not?
(b) How do you think password managers sync your
accounts across devices? Would you want this func-
tion? Why? Do you think this impacts your pass-
word security? If so, how?
(c) What do you think the password data looks like
when stored on your computer? If your password
is "password2018!", does your password manager
store it as "password2018!"? Is there a difference
when stored in the cloud?
5. Do you think password managers affect the security of
your accounts? Why or why not?
6. Do you trust password managers to always store or not
forget your passwords? Why or why not?
7. Do you trust password managers to protect your pass-
words from attackers? Why or why not?
8. Have you ever received advice or training on how to
create or manage passwords?
(a) (if yes) What guidelines have you been taught?
Where?
(b) (if yes) Do you use these guidelines? Why or why
not?
9. (non-PM user): Would you consider using a password
manager in the future? Why or why not?
10. (If "No" or "I don’t know" to data breach question) ear-
lier you mentioned that you were never impacted by a
data breach, or that you weren’t sure if you were. Would
you like the opportunity to verify this?We can use a
website called HaveIBeenPwned to check whether your
accounts were compromised in a public data breach.
(a) Explain to participant:The website asks for your
email address and checks if any accounts tied to it
were compromised. Note, however, that the website
cannot check information on every data breach. It
checks those that are known to the public
(b) If participant agrees, inform participant:For privacy
reasons, we recommend that you access the website
on your own device. This way, we won’t see your
email address, nor will we know which of your
accounts, if any, were impacted by a breach.
(c) Instruct the participant to try any other email ad-
dress they may use often.
(d) Were any of your accounts compromised? (if yes,
below)
i. How many?
ii. What types of accounts? (Provide categories
to choose from: social media, bank, shop-
ping,other)
iii. How do you feel about this information?
iv. (follow up, if necessary) Will you do anything-
with this information?
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